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ne of the profoundest ironies of the modern age is that the
natural science revolution—the source of so much that is
good, admirable, useful, and authoritative—has helped
inspire illusion amid the social sciences. What naturalism misses
is the deep disjuncture between human beings, who are creative,
rational, self-interpreting agents, and the other objects that compose the universe. The renewed call to humanism voiced by Taylor and MacIntyre requires carefully distinguishing human beings
from other sorts of objects. For science, no less than religion or
ideology, can be distorted and turned into a form of superstition.
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In this regard, the interpretive tradition is a precious resource for
resistance against the increasing naturalism that dominates our
technocratic age. For every day this distorting power advances,
stripping humanity of its dignity and replacing it with the levers
and gears of a deadened machine. These words not only conclude
Jason Blakely’s insightful commentary on the development of
Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor’s thinking but also summarize his argumentative purpose in this short and economical
work.
Naturalism in the social sciences has long been for me “the
emperor with no clothes,” so from the outset I must admit complete sympathy with and enthusiasm for Blakely’s purposes. Consequently, I would not be his best interlocutor for improving his
arguments. His commentary, however, has encouraged me to reread MacIntyre, whose work I have not picked up since a graduate
course in political philosophy at the University of British Columbia in the early 1990s. Further, Blakely’s commentary has impelled
me to read Charles Taylor for the first time, even though he is
somewhat of a household name in Canada.
Blakely’s book is required reading for anyone involved or interested in social or political research and policymaking. Indeed,
Blakely’s arguments—in expounding the thought of Taylor and
MacIntyre—provide an antidote to much of the chaos and rather
flimsy (though generally unarticulated) philosophical anthropologies currently evident in much policymaking and technocratic
forms of management prevalent in 2016.
As a trained social scientist, I have spent the last two decades
following a detour into theology as a consequence of pursuing a
vocation as a Roman Catholic priest and member of a religious
order. Therefore, I found Blakely’s book an excellent review of
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state of the discipline from the time Taylor and MacIntyre started
thinking about the human person as a social animal in the 1950s to
the present. I now find I have a way to exit the theological detour
and merge once again with the path of social and political thought.
My previous suspicions about “naturalism” in social scientific
thought and methods stemmed from two sources. First, I have
always been numerically challenged, so I could never really cotton to the dominance of the language of the behavioral approach
in social and political study. Second, in the research and writing
of my doctoral dissertation (1995), I was strongly influenced by
ordinary language philosophy in addition to the thought of R. G.
Collingwood and thus drew a strong distinction between the idea
of history and the idea of natural science. In addition to not having the confidence at the time to assert that there was really no
place for natural scientific methods in the study of human agency
and society, I saw no adverse effect in adopting a “live and let
live” stance toward a pluralism in social-scientific methodologies
that admit naturalism in its pantheon of approaches—indeed as its
dominant approach within this pantheon.
Two decades later, on the other hand, having since embraced
a thick theological anthropology, I can now see clearly the human
damage done by “naturalism” in its position as the dominant
method of the social sciences. Taylor and MacIntyre still admit
theoretical pluralism, but, according to Blakely, they offer a means
of objectively measuring between theoretical approaches. Rather
than determining which approach most nearly pretends to mimic
natural science, we need only answer one simple question: “Which
theoretical approach, by comparing it to others, better explains
the range, depth and nuance of human socio-political experience?”
(96–97)
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For example, the standard secularization thesis cannot account
for why religion widely still exists in an advanced industrialized
society such as the United States. The noted social scientist Steve
Bruce attempts to explain this lingering effect in the United States
citing the need for social cohesion among immigrant groups. (102)
Thus, according to Bruce, religion serves an “integrating function.” However, in challenging that approach, Taylor “believes
that functionalist explanations like Bruce’s in fact rest on a banality (i.e., a system of beliefs like religion helps create social cohesion) but are incapable of explaining why particular people adopt
the beliefs that they do, religious or otherwise.” (103) In contrast,
Taylor offers an alternate explanation, and the reader can decide
which offers a better account of the range, depth, and nuance of
human experience. I will not repeat Blakely’s account of Taylor’s
argument here, for the point is not to decide between the approaches but rather to demonstrate Blakely’s point that there is an
objective way of determining the best approach without appealing
to the criteria employed by the natural sciences. (104)
I now turn briefly to MacIntyre’s contribution which has further convinced me that my previously uncritical acceptance of naturalism within the pantheon of social scientific methodologies is
no longer appropriate. MacIntyre describes “a dual moral culture
that dominates late-capitalist societies: on the one side are rival
claims to foundational, quasi-scientific moral objective certainty
and on the other are subjectivist philosophies that reduce all morality to emotive preferences.” (105–6) For MacIntyre, this moral
chaos is rooted in Enlightenment naturalism. It was believed that
by rejecting religion and traditional understandings, morality—
following the model of the natural sciences—could be based on
reason alone. Enlightenment naturalism, however, generated not
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a single but several “rival naturalist standards for resolving moral
disagreement. . . . Various competing strains of utilitarianism,
natural rights theory, deontology, rival Marxisms, and so on all
laid claim to universal rational status.” (106–7)
Both Taylor and MacIntyre not only level a devastating critique of naturalism but also offer an alternative approach: a narrative of interpretive philosophical history. Contingent causes, and
not unvarying laws of nature, are what best explain human agency.
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